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A R T I C L E S

THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
RISKS OF CLIMATE REGULATION
by Jonathan H. Adler
Jonathan H. Adler is Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the
Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

SUMMARY
Prioritizing federal environmental regulation as the primary means of achieving dramatic, rapid reductions
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may be a strategic mistake. Regulatory mandates, particularly if based
upon existing statutory authority, will be vulnerable to legal attack, obstruction, and delay; climate legislation can reduce legal risks and accelerate policy implementation, but only on the margin. Adopting regulatory controls will be immensely resource-intensive for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other
agencies. Even with authorizing legislation, regulatory strategies may remain more time-consuming, conflictridden, and legally vulnerable than fiscal measures. A carbon tax, in particular, would be more legally secure
and administratively easier to implement than regulatory controls on energy use and GHG emissions.

T

he ink on the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA) was scarcely dry before the legal
assault on health care reform began. The first state
lawsuit, which would eventually reach the U.S. Supreme
Court, was literally filed the very same day President
Barack Obama signed the PPACA into law.1 Additional
lawsuits soon followed.2
Meaningful climate policies are certain to come under
equally aggressive legal attack. Indeed, some opponents
of the Obama Administration’s climate initiatives sought
to challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) Clean Power Plan (CPP) before it had even been
promulgated.3 Climate regulations, whether based on
Author’s Note: This Article is based upon a white paper
prepared for the Niskanen Center. The author would like to
thank those who offered comments on drafts of this Article,
including David Bookbinder, James Coleman, Joseph Majkut, Richard Pierce, Shuting Pomerleau, Nader Sobhani,
Steven Teles, and Christopher Walker. Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the author.
1.

2.
3.

See Complaint, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RVEMT), 2010 WL 1038209; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH), 2010 WL 11240598.
See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Mark Regan, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation Decade, 108 Geo. L.J. 1471 (2020) (detailing the PPACA’s “decade
in court”).
See In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 45 ELR 20110 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
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existing statutory authority or new legislation, will be
assailed in court and challenged throughout the administrative process. Such measures will be vulnerable to defeat
and delay.
There is a mismatch between the stated urgency of the
problem and the focus on federal regulation as the dominant climate policy tool. Environmental advocates and
the Joseph Biden Administration are committed to urgent
action on climate change. President Biden declared it a
“moral imperative” that the nation act swiftly, and has
called for bringing U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
below 50 percent of 2005 levels by 2030.4 Meeting this
target will require dramatic and rapid emission reductions,
as does the ultimate goal of stabilizing atmospheric GHG
concentrations at a sustainable level.5 Yet, some potential
paths forward entail significant practical obstacles and
legal risks, particularly if the aim is to achieve emission
reductions quickly.
Prioritizing regulatory measures over fiscal instruments
may be a strategic mistake. Regulatory mandates, particularly if based upon existing statutory authority, will be vulnerable to legal attack, obstruction, and delay. Even in the

4.
5.

See Lisa Friedman, Somini Sengupta & Coral Davenport, Biden, Calling for
Action, Commits U.S. to Halving Its Climate Emissions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,
2021.
See Coral Davenport, Biden Pledges Ambitious Climate Action. Here’s What
He Could Actually Do, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2020; Katie Glueck & Lisa
Friedman, Biden Announces $2 Trillion Climate Plan, N.Y. Times, July 14,
2020.
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best of times, the control of GHG emissions through federal regulation would be a long and cumbersome process,
requiring dozens of complex rulemakings. Yet these are not
the best of times. Federal agencies, EPA in particular, are
depleted of personnel and expertise.6 At the same time, a
phalanx of economic and ideological interests, including
state attorneys general,7 stand ready to challenge every climate policy initiative,8 and have already filed multiple such
suits against the Biden Administration.9
A potentially hostile judiciary will further complicate
efforts to make federal regulation a central component of
carbon control.10
Enactment of climate legislation, expressly authorizing
federal regulation of GHG emissions and other regulatory efforts to reduce the carbon intensity of the American
economy, can reduce the legal risks and accelerate the rate
at which such policies can be adopted and implemented,
but only on the margin. Adopting regulatory controls sector-by-sector, technology-by-technology, will be immensely
resource-intensive for EPA and other federal agencies. Even
with authorizing legislation, federal regulatory strategies
may remain more time-consuming, conflict-ridden, and
legally vulnerable than fiscal measures. A carbon tax, in
particular, would be more legally secure and administratively easier to implement than regulatory controls on
energy use and GHG emissions. In all likelihood, a nationwide carbon tax could be implemented in less time, and
with less legal and administrative wrangling, than a single,
sector-specific GHG emission standard.

6.

See Umair Irfan, The Mess That Biden’s EPA Nominee Michael Regan Will
Inherit, Explained, Vox, Feb. 8, 2021; Adam Aton, Biden Transition Team
Says It Underestimated Trump’s Damage, Climatewire, Jan. 6, 2021; Joe
Tollefson, Can Joe Biden Rebuild the Ravaged U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency?, Nature, Dec. 16, 2020; see also Naveena Sadasivam, Inside Biden’s
Uphill Battle to Restore the EPA After Trump, Grist, Mar. 1, 2021, https://
grist.org/politics/epa-joe-biden-environmental-law-enforcement-trump/.
7. As six state attorneys general warned the Biden Administration in a January
letter, “Our states have led the charge in successfully challenging unauthorized and unlawful executive actions . . . You can be assured that we will do so
again, if necessary.” Letter from Patrick Morrissey, West Virginia Attorney
General et al., to President Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://ago.
wv.gov/Documents/2021.01.27%20Letter%20--%20President%20Biden.
pdf.
8. See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, As Biden Vows Monumental Action on
Climate Change, a Fight With the Fossil Fuel Industry Has Only Begun, Wash.
Post, Jan. 29, 2021 (“as [President Biden] detailed his plans, the gas, oil
and coal industries were already mobilizing on all fronts, . . . aiming to slow
Biden’s unprecedented push for climate action and keep profits from fossil
fuels flowing”).
9. See Joey Garrison & Ledyard King, 12 Republican State Attorneys General
Sue President Biden Over Climate Change Order, USA Today, Mar. 15, 2021
(suit filed to challenge Executive Order No. 13990 and revision of “social
cost of carbon”); Emma Newburger, 14 GOP State Attorneys General Sue
Biden Administration Over Oil and Gas Leasing Moratorium, CNBC, Mar.
24, 2021 (two separate suits filed challenging moratorium on new oil and
gas leases on federal lands and waters).
10. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Legal Risk Hangs Over Biden’s Climate Plans,
Resources, Dec. 14, 2020, https://www.resources.org/common-resources/
legal-risk-hangs-over-bidens-climate-plans/; Michael B. Gerrard,
American Constitution Society, Presidential Progress on Climate
Change: Will the Courts Interfere With What Needs to Be Done
to Save Our Planet? (2021); see also Samuel Moyn & Aaron Belkin,
Take Back the Court, The Roberts Court Would Likely Strike
Down Climate Legislation (2019).
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Any meaningful climate policy will face concerted
opposition. If climate policy is to be effective, the fact of
such opposition, and its potential to delay and derail implementation, must be taken into account. It is often said that
the perfect policy should not be the enemy of the good.
It is equally true that a good policy that cannot be implemented as planned is not so good after all. If the aim is to
adopt climate policy measures that are capable of reducing
GHG emissions quickly and sustainably, this analysis suggests a carbon tax and federal spending initiatives are more
promising than federal regulatory measures.
This Article surveys the legal vulnerabilities and administrative obstacles to the rapid adoption of regulatory measures capable of achieving meaningful GHG reductions. It
does not purport to identify which climate policies would
be the most effective in the abstract, or in the absence of
administrative and legal constraints. Nor does the Article
make any claims about what sorts of measures can pass
the U.S. Congress now or in the future.11 Rather, it seeks
to inform the choice of climate strategies by highlighting
the risks faced by climate measures once they are enacted
by Congress or promulgated by federal regulatory agencies.

I.

Enacting Regulatory Measures Under
Existing Statutory Authority

The Biden Administration has taken the reins of federal
environmental policy after four years of concerted (though
not always successful) efforts to roll back federal climate
change policies. The Donald Trump Administration
devoted substantial effort to undoing the climate policies
of the Obama Administration.12 While no real effort was
made to undo the endangerment finding that serves as
the predicate for regulation of GHGs as pollutants under
the Clean Air Act (CAA)13 (likely because any such effort
would have failed in court14), the Trump Administration
was able to weaken or repeal various regulatory measures,

11. For a discussion of how a carbon tax and other fiscal measures may be adopted through the budget reconciliation process, see Joseph Majkut, Annabelle Swift & Peter Marsters, Niskanen Center, A Carbon Tax in
the Context of Budget Reconciliation (2021), https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/A-Carbon-Tax-in-the-Contextof-Budget-Reconcilliation.pdf.
12. See Juliet Eilperin, Brady Dennis & John Muyskens, Trump Rolled Back
More Than 125 Environmental Safeguards. Here’s How, Wash. Post, Oct. 30,
2020; Cayli Baker, The Trump Administration’s Major Environmental Deregulations, Brookings Inst., Dec. 15, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
up-front/2020/12/15/the-trump-administrations-major-environmentalderegulations/. For a focus on the legal bases for the Trump Administration’s
efforts to roll back regulations under the Clean Air Act (CAA), see Joseph
Goffman & Laura Bloomer, Disempowering the EPA: How Statutory Interpretation of the Clean Air Act Serves the Trump Administration’s Deregulatory
Agenda, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 929 (2020).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
14. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit rejected a legal challenge to the endangerment finding in 2012. See Coalition
for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d
102, 42 ELR 20260 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Since then, the scientific support for
EPA’s conclusion that GHG emissions cause or contribute to air pollution
that may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, as
required by the CAA, has only gotten stronger. See Michael Burger, Jessica
Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 Colum. J. Env’t L. 57 (2020).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

6-2021

Copyright © 2021 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

including the regulation of GHG emissions from oil and
gas development,15 regulations governing fuel economy
and GHG emissions from motor vehicles,16 and the CPP.17
New regulations adopted under EPA’s CAA authority to
regulate GHGs, such as regulations on aviation-related
emissions, were weaker than environmental advocates
would have hoped.18
The Biden Administration has clear legal authority to
reverse many of these regulatory initiatives, if it is willing
to put in the time and effort required.19 Reviving some
Obama Administration regulations (other than the CPP),
and adopting more stringent regulations of industry-specific GHG emissions, should be possible with relatively
little legal risk. Tightening other regulatory measures, such
as the national ambient air quality standards for ozone or
particulates, could yield additional GHG reductions.20
Producing the level of emission reductions necessary to
meet the Administration’s stated targets, on the other
hand, will require more; and if EPA seeks to regulate GHG
emissions more broadly under existing legal authority, its
efforts would confront significant legal risks.
Federal agencies only have that regulatory authority delegated to them by Congress.21 Absent a delegation from
Congress, agencies may not impose regulatory burdens
or mandates on individuals, firms, or state and local governments. This is particularly true where agencies seek to
adopt far-reaching regulatory measures with substantial
economic effects. As the Supreme Court has explained
repeatedly, where Congress wants agencies to resolve questions of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’” it
is expected to do so “expressly.”22 And where an agency

15. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 57018 (Sept. 14, 2020); Oil
and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and
Modified Sources Reconsideration, 85 Fed. Reg. 57398 (Sept. 15, 2020).
16. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One
National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019).
17. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions
to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520
(July 8, 2019). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the
Trump Administration rules repealing the CPP and adopting an alternative, see American Lung Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 985
F.3d 914, 51 ELR 20009 (D.C. Cir. 2021), but this decision did not resuscitate the CPP, and the Biden Administration has indicated it will develop
an alternative.
18. See Nick Sobczyk, EPA Finalizes First-Ever Airplane Greenhouse Gas
Regulations, Greenwire, Dec. 28, 2020 (noting environmental groups
believed rules were insufficient); see also Sungjoo Ahn, EPA’s New Aviation Emissions Standard: Why It’s Already Obsolete, Harv. Env’t & Energy L. Program, Feb. 25, 2021, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/
epas-aviation-emissions-standard/.
19. See Jeff Tollefson, Can Joe Biden Make Good on His Ambitious Climate
Agenda?, Nature, Dec. 10, 2020, at 207 (discussing work load of undoing
Trump Administration rules).
20. See Richardson, supra note 10 (noting that tightening existing regulation of
particulate emissions would also reduce GHG emissions).
21. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); see also Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355,
374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until
Congress confers power upon it.”).
22. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 323, 44 ELR 20132
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“claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American
economy,’” the Court will “greet its announcement with a
measure of skepticism.”23
In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency that GHGs constitute “pollutants” subject to regulation under §202 of the CAA.24 This
decision provided the legal basis for the Obama Administration to begin regulating GHGs under the CAA, first
from motor vehicles (the subject of §202), and then from
stationary sources.25 The Court’s decision made it clear that
EPA has some authority to regulate GHG emissions, but it
should not be overread.
Despite the broad language of Justice John Paul Stevens’
majority opinion in Massachusetts, it would be a mistake to
conclude that EPA may treat GHGs as pollutants for all
potentially relevant provisions of the CAA. The bulk of the
CAA was drafted to provide authority for the regulation of
traditional pollutants, such as ozone precursors and particulates. Applying these provisions to GHGs is not always
straightforward, largely because GHGs in general, and carbon dioxide in particular, are so ubiquitous.26
Emission thresholds drafted for particulates and nitrogen
oxides apply far more broadly when applied to GHGs—so
much so that, by EPA’s own account, permitting authorities would be “paralyzed” by the influx of required permits.27 Specifically, EPA estimated that a strict application
of the statutory emission thresholds for “major” stationary
sources under CAA §165 to GHGs would increase the
number of required air pollution permits under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program “more
than 140-fold,” from 280 to more than 40,000 per year.28
Subjecting GHGs to the numerical emission thresholds
of the CAA’s omnibus permitting provisions in Title V
would be even more burdensome, increasing the number
of covered facilities from approximately 15,000 to around
six million.29
The Obama Administration sought to address this concern by phasing in the regulation of GHGs from stationary
sources in ways that avoid the “absurd results” that would

23.
24.
25.

26.
27.

28.
29.

(2014) (UARG)); see also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at
159).
549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007). For a detailed and insightful look
at the legal strategy that led to this decision, see Richard J. Lazarus, The
Rule of Five: Climate History at the Supreme Court (2020).
For a discussion of how the Massachusetts decision unlocked EPA’s authority
to regulate GHGs under the CAA, see Jody Freeman, The Environmental
Protection Agency’s Role in U.S. Climate Policy—A Fifty Year Appraisal, 31
Duke Env’t L. & Pol’y F. 1, 52-65 (2020); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Heat
Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the
Obama Administration, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 421 (2011).
See Freeman, supra note 25, at 56 (noting the “problem” of trying to apply
the CAA’s provisions to GHGs).
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55294 (Oct. 27, 2009) (proposed rule);
see also Freeman, supra note 25, at 56 (discussing how applying the CAA’s
numerical emission thresholds to GHGs was “administratively unmanageable and politically unappealing”).
74 Fed. Reg. at 55301.
Id. at 55295.
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be produced by applying the relevant CAA provisions, as
written, to GHG emissions.30 Yet as the Supreme Court
concluded, EPA lacks statutory authority to adjust the regulatory thresholds in this fashion.31
Faced with the incongruous consequences of applying
statutory provisions designed to accommodate the regulation of traditional pollutants to GHGs, the Supreme Court
curtailed EPA’s regulatory authority. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Court
concluded that if relevant CAA provisions are not easily
applied to GHGs, then GHGs should not be considered
“pollutants” for purposes of those provisions.32 In other
words, the CAA is not an all-purpose climate policy statute, and it may not be read that way by EPA. The fact that
GHGs could be considered air pollutants for some portions
of the CAA does not mean that they are pollutants within
the meaning of other portions.33
While the Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)
allowed EPA to regulate GHG emissions from the largest stationary sources—those that were already subject to
CAA regulation—it did not allow EPA to use GHG emissions as the basis for asserting regulatory authority over a
broader swath of American industry than had previously
been subject to federal environmental regulation. Due to
the practical consequences of such regulation, the UARG
Court determined it was unlikely that Congress had
granted EPA such authority.34 Though not a reversal of the
Massachusetts holding, UARG limits it. Equally significant,
UARG laid the groundwork for rejecting future efforts to
expand EPA authority over GHGs. It was, in the words
of Harvard Law School’s Jody Freeman, “a decision laced
with the equivalent of improvised explosive devices.”35
It did not take long for the first of those devices to go
off. In February 2016, a majority of the Court voted to
stay the Obama Administration’s CPP, thereby preventing it from going into effect.36 This was a highly unusual
move, particularly as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit had already declined
30. Id. at 55303-20; see also Freeman, supra note 25, at 56-57 (discussing EPA’s
decision to raise the applicable thresholds administratively).
31. As one commentator noted, this rule was “a brazen attempt to evade the
plain text of the Clean Air Act.” Nathan Richardson, The Rise and Fall of
Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 10 Mich. J. Env’t & Admin. L. (forthcoming
2021).
32. 573 U.S. 302, 44 ELR 20132 (2014).
33. Id. at 320:
there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting “any air
pollutant” in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be
sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those
atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such
vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those
programs and render them unworkable as written.
34. Id. at 322 (“A brief review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no
doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and
cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources
capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.”).
35. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 Harv. Env’t L. Rev.
9, 9-10 (2015); see also Richardson, supra note 31, at 9-10 (“UARG did
more than ‘chip away’ at Massachusetts; it limited the case to its facts: the
single provision of the Clean Air Act at issue.”).
36. Chamber of Commerce v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999
(2016) (mem.).
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a stay request, and such decisions are rarely second-guessed
by the Supreme Court.37 That action by the Court proved
fatal for the CPP, which was stopped in its tracks before it
could be implemented.
The Supreme Court’s stay suggested that a majority of
the Court was skeptical of the CPP’s legality, either because
they believed it exceeded the scope of EPA’s delegated powers or that EPA cut procedural corners when adopting the
rule. We cannot know for sure, as there was no opinion,
let alone a ruling on the merits.38 The stay was nonetheless a powerful signal that the Court was wary of how
the Obama Administration had sought to use the CAA
to combat climate change. Though the Court’s composition has changed since the stay was ordered, few believe
it has become more hospitable to federal regulation in the
interim. To the contrary, the Court is likely more conservative and more skeptical of the administrative state than
when it reviewed Obama Administration climate policies.39
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has
made clear that broad assertions of agency authority are
disfavored. The delegation of authority to regulate is not to
be presumed and should be based on unambiguous statutory text. Where an agency seeks to assert broad regulatory
authority over large portions of the American economy, the
Court expects to see clear statutory authority.40 The Justices believe that questions of “deep economic and political significance”41—so-called major questions—should
be answered by Congress, not federal agencies.42 So, if an
agency seeks to expand its regulatory authority, such as
by regulating GHGs throughout the economy, the agency
must persuade the Court that Congress authorized such
action “expressly.” This doctrine, repeatedly embraced by
a majority of the Justices and aggressively pushed by the

37. As Lisa Heinzerling observed, “In staying EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the Supreme Court for the first time stopped a nationally applicable agency regulation prior to an initial decision on the merits of the rule in a lower court.”
Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 Geo. L.J.
425, 425 (2016).
38. This is often the consequence of Supreme Court decisions to resolve cases on
the “shadow docket.” See generally William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme
Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1 (2015) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s “shadow docket”).
39. For this author’s assessment of the Supreme Court’s approach to environmental law questions, see Jonathan H. Adler, Which Way for the Roberts
Court? Env’t F. (Nov.-Dec. 2020).
40. In effect, the Court has adopted a substantive canon, or “clear statement
rule,” against finding broad delegations of authority where such delegations
are not explicit. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 315 (2000) (describing various canons of construction against finding
broad delegations); see also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine
as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223; Cass R. Sunstein, The
American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1181 (2018).
41. UARG, 573 U.S. at 323.
42. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Response, Short-Circuiting the
New Major Questions Doctrine, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 147 (2017) (discussing the reliance upon the “major questions” doctrine in King v. Burwell);
see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“Although it is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we
apply the major questions doctrine in service of the constitutional rule that
Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that
power to an executive agency.”).
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Chief Justice43 and Justice Brett Kavanaugh44 in particular, provides a road map for legal challenges to efforts
by the Biden Administration to expand GHG regulation
under the CAA without additional, explicit authorization
from Congress.
The Biden Administration could decide to go beyond
the repeal and replacement of Trump Administration climate-related rules, such as by seeking to adopt a CPP 2.0 or
attempting to invoke other provisions of the CAA to target
climate change.45 Some have urged EPA to declare carbon
dioxide a “criteria air pollutant” for which EPA is obligated
to set national ambient air quality standards.46 Others have
urged the invocation of §115’s largely dormant authority to
regulate emissions that endanger public health or welfare
in foreign countries to authorize broad GHG regulation,
due to the international character of climate change.47 Any
such initiative would prompt immediate legal challenge
and would likely face a frosty reception from the Supreme
Court.48 The path of bold regulatory escalation would thus
represent a particularly high-risk climate change strategy,
even before considering the substantial effort any such initiatives would require.

II.

Navigating the Administrative Process

Even where federal agencies have the unquestioned authority to regulate, they may not be able to act quickly to adopt
new rules, particularly where (as in the case of climate
change) such regulations are certain to be subject to legal
challenge. One reason Congress delegates authority to fed43. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015); City of Arlington v. Federal
Commc’ns Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 312, 43 ELR 20112 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
44. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.), denying cert.
to United States v. Paul, 718 F. App’x 360 (6th Cir. 2017) (statement of Kavanaugh, J.); see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n, 855
F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) (stressing that “clear congressional authorization matters” for agencies to have broad regulatory authority).
45. At the time of this writing, there is some indication the Biden Administration may adopt such a course. See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA to
Jettison Major Obama Climate Rule, as Biden Eyes a Bigger Push, Wash. Post,
Feb. 12, 2021 (“the Biden Administration is seeking a court’s blessing to
propose a new rule aimed at limiting greenhouse gas pollution from the nation’s power plants”). Reports also indicate the Administration may consider
a national clean energy standard. See White House Will Seek Law to Require
Carbon-Free Power From U.S. Utilities, Reuters, Apr. 1, 2021.
46. See Center for Biological Diversity, Petition to Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (Dec.
2, 2009), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf.
47. See 42 U.S.C. §7415. For a discussion of how this provision could apply to
GHGs, see Michael Burger, Ann E. Carlson, Michael Gerrard, Jayni Hein,
Jason A. Schwartz & Keith J. Benes, Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 Geo. Env’t L. Rev.
359 (2016).
48. Of note, on January 19, 2021, EPA denied petitions seeking the setting
of national ambient air quality standards for GHGs, and the regulation of
GHGs under §§115 and 112 of the CAA. Letter from Andrew Wheeler,
Administrator, U.S. EPA, to Kassie Siegel, Director, Center for Biological
Diversity et al. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/21-01-19-GHG-NAAQS-Petition-Denial-2021-01-19.pdf. On March 11, 2021, Acting EPA Administrator Jane
Nishida retracted the denial. See Jean Chemnick, Whiff of the Unthinkable
at EPA: CO2 Standards for States, Climatewire, Mar. 17, 2021.
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eral regulatory agencies is because of their expertise and
ability to incorporate new information and understanding in developing regulations.49 Members of Congress
may also prefer not to revisit individual issues on a regular basis, allowing administrative agencies to develop and
implement policies with minimal intervention.50 It would
be a mistake to view the regulatory process as particularly
nimble or quick, however. Rather, as some scholars have
noted, it can be quite “ossified.”51
Developing a significant federal regulation can take years
of effort by agency officials. Assuming a federal agency has
the legal authority to adopt a regulation, the agency must
first develop a regulatory proposal. This process alone can
take many months, if not years.52 At least one study of EPA
rulemaking found that the amount of time the Agency
spent developing a regulatory measure prior to proposing
the rule could be twice as long as the time period between
publishing a proposed rule and finalizing the rule.53
Once the regulatory proposal is ready, it is published in
the Federal Register with a notice of proposed rulemaking.
This notice typically triggers a comment period, during
which affected interests and others may submit comments
about the proposed rule, raising objections and identifying
those portions of the proposal that are particularly good or
particularly bad.
The proposing agency must review and respond to the
filed comments. This too is time-consuming. It is also quite
important. Failure to respond adequately to objections or
concerns is a common basis upon which federal courts
invalidate agency regulations. Thus, a responsible agency
that wishes to see its regulation upheld in court will diligently review submitted comments, address any substantive
legal, scientific, or technical complaints, and (if necessary)
revise the proposed rule to fix any potential problems. At
the same time, economic and ideological interests can be
expected to seed the comment process with all manner of
objections, in the hope that the agency will fail to respond
appropriately or make some other misstep.

49. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative
Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1097,
1097 (2015) (“Congress establishes administrative agencies and often gives
them substantial discretion because it lacks the expertise and political agreement to resolve the policy issues that are likely to arise under a statutory
scheme.”); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne J. O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 925-26 (2008) (“A central premise of
the administrative state is that agencies have better information and greater
expertise than the Congress that initially delegates authority to agencies”).
50. On the other hand, the failure of Congress to revisit and reform extant
statutes may mean that statutes become obsolete and lose some degree of
democratic legitimacy. See generally Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J.
Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931 (2020).
51. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992). For an overview of the debate
over regulatory “ossification,” see Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to “Testing the Ossification Hypothesis,” 80 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1493 (2012).
52. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 1496 (noting EPA rulemaking may take six to
eight years for a single rule).
53. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Y. Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin.
L. Rev. 99, 144 n.150 (2011). This study looked at EPA rulemaking under
the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the CAA.
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Although agencies often have cause to revise their regulatory proposals in light of the comments they receive, the
agency cannot revise the rule too much without creating a
new set of legal vulnerabilities. A final regulation must be
a “logical outgrowth” of the original proposal in order to
survive legal challenge.54 If, during the comment period,
the agency decides that a rule must undergo significant
revision, a cautious agency will publish a supplemental
notice and invite additional comment, further extending
the time frame for issuing a final rule by several months, if
not longer. Failure to supplement the rulemaking process
in this way is often fatal to regulatory endeavors.55
Given the demands of this process, it should be no surprise that the time between a notice of proposed rulemaking and a final rule is typically well over one year, longer
for particularly controversial or complex rules. At EPA, the
average time between the initial notice and the final rule
is over 600 days.56 In the case of the CPP, EPA initially
published a proposed rule on June 18, 2014. This proposal,
which filled more than 120 pages in the Federal Register,
took months (if not years) to develop.57 After an extensive
public comment period and public hearings, and a supplemental proposal published in October 2014, EPA finalized
the rule; it was published in the Federal Register on October
23, 2015.58 (A rule must be published in the Federal Register
before it may take effect.) The rule never went into force,
however, as it was stayed by the Supreme Court in February 2016.59 As noted above, the stay suggested that a majority of Justices doubted the CPP’s legality, even after it was
vetted through that extensive process.60
Undoing rules is no easier than adopting them. As a
general rule, it takes at least as much time and agency
resources to revise or undo an agency action as it did to take
the initial action in the first place. The relevant provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) apply equally
to adopting and repealing federal regulations,61 and the

54. See, e.g., Environmental Integrity Project v. Environmental Prot. Agency,
425 F.3d 992, 995-98 (D.C. Cir. 2005); National Mining Ass’n v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Horsehead Res.
Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 24 ELR 20562 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Shell
Oil Co. v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 950 F.2d 741, 757-63, 22 ELR
20305 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 102122, 9 ELR 20284 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
55. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 53, at 110 (“the courts have made it
painfully clear that if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must be essentially
in final form at the proposed rule stage”).
56. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 946 (“EPA nondeadline actions
take an average of 685 days, versus 611 days for deadline actions.”).
57. See U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet: Settlement Agreements to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Generating Units and Refineries (2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2013-09/documents/settlementfactsheet.pdf (noting EPA entered into
a settlement agreement concerning stationary source GHG regulation in
2010 under which it committed to proposing such regulations no later than
July 2011 and final rules no later than May 2012).
58. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (final
rule). The procedural history of the rule is summarized in id. at 64703-04.
59. See Chamber of Commerce v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999
(2016) (mem.).
60. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §551(5) (defining “rulemaking” as “agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule”).
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standard of judicial review is no more lenient for changes
in agency position.62 In addition, as the Supreme Court
emphasized in its decision rejecting the Trump Administration’s attempt to undo the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, before changing course agencies
must give extra attention to any reliance interests that may
have accrued—that is, plans and investments that other
parties made on the basis of the rules in place.63
Accordingly, the effort to repeal the CPP was nearly
as time-consuming as had been the effort to adopt it. In
March 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order
instructing EPA to review and consider rescinding the CPP
and other EPA regulations affecting the energy industry.64
EPA issued a proposed repeal of the CPP that October.65
Two months later, in December 2017, EPA published
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for a possible
replacement of the CPP. The final rule repealing and
replacing the CPP with the Trump Administration alternative was published on July 8, 2019, to take effect in September.66 As with the CPP, the rule faced an unwelcome
reception in federal court, and was struck down by the
D.C. Circuit in January 2021.67
The APA requires that agencies provide “a concise general statement” of a regulation’s “basis and purpose.”68 In
practice, the accompanying statement is neither concise nor
general. To the contrary, when an agency publishes a final
rule, the Federal Register notice may span dozens of pages.
One hundred-plus-page notices are not uncommon, and
are often supported by additional documentation, including regulatory impact analyses and response to comment
documents. The various procedural requirements may be
excessive or unnecessary, as some scholars have argued, but
they are what courts expect.
A successful court challenge to a federal regulation may
require an agency to start over from scratch. Therefore, it
behooves agencies to take their time to ensure they can
demonstrate to a reviewing court that they acted within
their legal authority, considered relevant matters, and
engaged in “reasoned decision-making.” Agencies that

62. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42, 13 ELR 20672 (1983) (“the direction in which an agency
chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial review established
by law”).
63. See Department of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (“When an agency changes course, as [the Department of Homeland Security] DHS did here, it must ‘be cognizant that longstanding policies may have “engendered serious reliance interests that must
be taken into account.”’” (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136
S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (cleaned up)).
64. See Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017). See also
Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16329 (Apr. 4, 2017).
65. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (Oct. 16, 2017)
(proposed rule).
66. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 34520 (July
8, 2019) (final rule).
67. Although the three judges disagreed on the rationale, they were unanimous
in rejecting the Trump regulation. See American Lung Ass’n v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 985 F.3d 914, 51 ELR 20009 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
68. See 5 U.S.C. §553.
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wish to see their rules upheld in court spend extra time
ensuring that they have responded to any concerns that
could be raised in litigation. Cutting corners in the rulemaking process increases the likelihood of a successful
legal challenge.69
Judicial review, much like the rulemaking process, takes
substantial time as well, often several years. Sometimes,
courts allow regulations to take effect while review is pending, but not always, and particularly not when courts are
made aware of serious challenges to a regulation’s legality.
As noted above, the Supreme Court took the unusual step
of staying the Obama Administration’s CPP, and the Court
appears increasingly willing to consider such motions
before high-profile cases are resolved by lower courts.70
Where one regulation serves as the predicate or complement to another regulatory initiative, the delays wrought by
the procedural requirements and judicial review can cause
something of a traffic jam. If an agency needs to know that
one rule will be in place before adopting a related policy
in a subsequent rule, it can be forced to wait while legal
challenges to the predicate rule work their way through the
judicial system. And if the predicate regulation is invalidated, the agency may have to redo that rule from scratch
before proceeding to the next one.
As the above indicates, the rulemaking process is incredibly resource-intensive for federal agencies. This limits the
number of major rules an agency can be expected to promulgate in a given year or at a given time. In this regard, it
is worth noting that EPA does not typically finalize more
than seven significant regulations in a given year.71
The American economy cannot be decarbonized by issuing a handful of rules, however. Each discrete regulatory
requirement will have to navigate the process, and each
must be based upon its own legal authority. This means
promulgating regulations, sector-by-sector and source category-by-source category, and revising these regulations on
a periodic basis. This is a long, arduous road for climate
policy to travel.

III. Authorizing Climate Regulation
Through Legislation
Seeking to use the existing CAA to meet ambitious GHG
reduction targets poses legal risk. Enacting climate legislation can reduce some of the risks to climate regulation,
but not all of them.72 First, and most significantly, standards and requirements enacted into law by Congress are
not subject to the delays and legal challenges that may

69. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 971 (noting that “when agencies
sacrifice deliberative process” to accelerate the regulatory process, “the odds
that existing decisions will fail” to survive judicial review increase).
70. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133
Harv. L. Rev. 123 (2019); see also Baude, supra note 38.
71. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Environmental Litigation: Impact of Deadline Suits on EPA’s Rulemaking Is Limited 9
(2014) (GAO-15-34) (noting that EPA issued 32 major rules between May
31, 2008, and June 1, 2013, for an average of 6.4 major rules per year).
72. See Freeman, supra note 25, at 71 (“regulation, while a powerful tool, is less
durable than legislation”).
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stall or sidetrack agency regulations. Agencies are subject
to the requirements of reasoned decisionmaking and the
APA. Congress is not. In addition, if Congress clearly and
explicitly delegates authority to specific agencies to adopt
particular types of regulations, this would prevent legal
challenges premised on the argument that Congress has
failed to authorize agency action, including legal challenges that would be based upon the “major questions”
doctrine. Even better, if Congress writes relevant legal
requirements directly into the statute, as it has sometimes
done in revising the CAA, it would eliminate any question
about agency authority.
While climate legislation would close the door on some
legal challenges, many legal and administrative pitfalls
would remain. For starters, insofar as legislation instructs
agencies to adopt regulations, those regulations would still
be subject to the relevant procedural requirements and
legal challenges as are other regulatory actions. The adoption of rules would still involve a time-consuming rulemaking process, and the results of any such rulemakings
would be subject to legal challenges and delays much like
other regulations. Further, insofar as such legislation either
delegated broad, open-ended authority or attempted to
conscript state governments to assist in achieving its goals,
it would be vulnerable to other sorts of legal challenges.
Regulatory climate legislation is sure to produce a dramatic increase in relevant agency work loads and litigation. Consider H.R. 1512, the Climate Leadership and
Environmental Action for Our Nation’s Future Act (aka
CLEAN Future Act) introduced in March 2021 as an
example.73 This proposed bill outlines a comprehensive
regulatory strategy for shifting away from fossil fuels
and reducing GHG emissions.74 It also envisions imposing dramatic new obligations on existing agencies, the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and EPA in particular, including the issuance of dozens of new regulations
within a very short time frame.
The CLEAN Future Act contemplates requiring EPA to
adopt new regulations for the following, all within the first
two years after the statute’s enactment, either alone or in
conjunction with other agencies:
•

Standards of measurement for determining the carbon intensity of categories of electricity-generating
units for determining and issuing zero-emission
electricity credits (§204);

•

Standards for the safe and permanent storage of carbon dioxide for the purpose of issuing zero-emission electricity credits (§204);

73. See H.R. 1512, 117th Cong. (2021) (as introduced on March 2, 2021).
74. See Nick Sobczyk, Top Dems Unveil Sweeping Climate, Environmental Justice Bill, E&E News PM, Mar. 2, 2021 (“Top House Democrats today
introduced a bill that offers an economywide outline to achieve net-zero
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, a potential starting point for the kind
of broad climate change legislation that President Biden promised on the
campaign trail.”).
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•

Rules to ensure generating units eligible for zeroemission electricity credits abide by applicable labor
standards (§204);

•

Measures implementing a proposed clean electricity
standard (§210);

•

Requirements for annual benchmarking submissions from owners of covered buildings (§383);

•

GHG emission standards for “every class or category of new nonroad engines and new nonroad
vehicles” (§401);

•

GHG emission standards for new locomotives and
engines used in locomotives (§401);

•

GHG emission standards for new and in-service
aircraft engines (§401);

•

Standards for products and materials to be designated eligible for a federal “Buy Clean” program
(§524);

•

Injection-well standards for enhanced oil recovery
and carbon sequestration (§621);

•

Revision of the criteria for coal combustion residual
units (§622);

•

Listing of hydrogen sulfide as a hazardous air pollutant (§624);

•

Determination of whether drilling fluids and like
materials are to be listed as hazardous wastes (§625);

•

Revision of criteria for the receipt and handling of
drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes
associated with oil and gas development (§625);

•

Methane emission standards for the oil and natural
gas sector (§701);

•

Prohibition of unnecessary flaring at natural gas
wells (§702);

•

Black carbon emission standards (§712);

•

Standards for state preparation and submission of
GHG emission inventories (Title VIII; Subtitle A);

•

Standards for the submission of state climate plans
for “planning period 1,” including model emission
control strategies, governing emissions through
2030 (Title VIII; Subtitle A);

•

Minimum criteria for state climate plans and plan
revisions that must be met before EPA review of
state submissions (Title VIII; Subtitle A);
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•

Standards for carbon-sink measurement (Title
VIII; Subtitle A);

•

Standards for the implementation of the subtitle
on product standards and producer responsibility
(Title IX; Subtitle B).

This is a tremendous amount of regulation for a single
agency to produce within a two-year period, particularly
an agency (like EPA) that lacks the resources to fulfill its
current legal obligations.
The above-listed are only a portion of what the CLEAN
Future Act would require of EPA, however. It also requires
EPA to promulgate additional regulations on a longer timescale or without a set deadline, and further anticipates
that EPA will be required to review and update many of
these regulations on a periodic basis. In addition, the draft
legislation requires EPA to review and approve (or disapprove) state climate plans modeled on the existing CAA
state implementation plan process and to impose a “federal backstop carbon fee” in noncompliant states. Were
that not enough, the draft Act further requires EPA to
review and provide written recommendations and reviews
of hundreds of action plans developed by federal agencies
and their subunits every two years,75 and to issue various
reports and analyses to guide federal climate efforts. However appealing such a strategy may be in the abstract, it
threatens to overload EPA’s administrative and regulatory
capacity, facilitate state resistance, and encourage extensive litigation over its implementation, virtually ensuring
that few of its goals would be achieved within the desired
time frame.
To be sure, adopting standards directly into statute can
protect regulatory measures against some legal challenges.
Such standards may be more difficult to revise over time,
however, making it harder to account for economic, technological, or environmental changes. For this reason, some
regulatory statutes impose a first round of regulatory standards expressly, while requiring the implementing agency
to reconsider and revise the standards on a periodic basis.
This is a strategy that has been used in the CAA and is
incorporated in portions of the CLEAN Future Act discussion draft.
The enactment of major new regulatory legislation
inevitably triggers a flurry of litigation as federal agencies
begin to unpack and apply the law’s provisions. This was
true of the 1990 CAA Amendments, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the PPACA, just
to name a few.76 As a general rule, the more complex, con-

75. The CLEAN Future Act would impose this requirement on every federal
agency as defined in the APA. As odd as it may sound, it is not clear how
many agencies this encompasses, as it encompasses “each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency.” 5 U.S.C. §551(1). According to the Sourcebook
of United States Executive Agencies, this is somewhere between 100 and 600
separate entities. See Administrative Conference of the United States,
Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 12 (2d ed. 2018).
76. See Jonathan H. Adler, Of Kings to Come: The Future of Health Care Reform Still Remains in Federal Court, 20 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 133, 135
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troversial, and costly a piece of legislation, the more litigation it will produce. Delegating authority to administrative
agencies to adopt regulations implementing the statute is a
further spur to litigation, as the promulgation of each final
rule presents a new opportunity to file suit. After all, with
each regulatory decision, agencies risk pleasing one set of
interested parties while angering another. And with each
final agency action, those upset with the results have their
opportunity to go to court.

IV. The False Promise of Agency Deadlines
Cognizant of the potential for administrative implementation to lag, Congress often imposes deadlines for agencies
to act.77 Environmental agencies, and EPA in particular, are
among those subject to the greatest number of deadlines.78
Yet the inclusion of deadlines in legislation hardly ensures
that agencies adopt measures on the congressionally preferred schedule. To the contrary, federal regulatory agencies routinely miss deadlines imposed by Congress, and
judicial enforcement of statutory deadlines occurs after the
fact, if at all.
According to an analysis conducted by the R Street
Institute, federal agencies failed to meet over one-half
of the more than 1,400 deadlines imposed by Congress
between 1995 and 2014.79 An earlier study by law professors Jacob Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell reported
even worse findings, concluding that agencies met regulatory deadlines less than 30% of the time between 1988 and
2003.80 A 2011 report by Public Citizen suggested an even
deeper problem, finding that federal regulatory agencies
missed statutorily imposed deadlines for more than 75% of
regulations reviewed.81 This problem has persisted. Just last
fall, California announced its intent to sue DOE for failing
to meet mandatory deadlines to revise energy-efficiency
standards for 25 product categories.82
The APA authorizes suits to compel agency action that
has been “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”83
yet such suits do not appear to do much to increase agency
alacrity. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
review of suits and settlements by EPA found little evidence that such suits influenced EPA’s regulatory pri-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

(2016) (discussing litigation under the 1990 CAA Amendments, ERISA,
and PPACA).
See generally Kevin J. Hickey, Congressional Research Service, Agency Delay: Congressional and Judicial Means to Expedite Agency
Rulemaking (2018).
See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 981 tbl.2.
See Scott Atherley, Federal Agency Compliance With Congressional Regulatory Deadlines 1 (R Street Policy Study No. 39, 2015),
https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/RSTREET39.pdf.
Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 949-50 n.84 (reporting “the agency
met the deadline in only 26.99% of the cases” reviewed).
Public Citizen, Public Safeguards Past Due: Missed Deadlines Leave
Public Unprotected (2012), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/public-safeguards-past-due-report.pdf.
See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of the State of California,
Attorney General Becerra Announces Intent to Sue Energy Department
Over Failure to Update 25 Energy Efficiency Standards (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announcesintent-sue-energy-department-over-failure.
See 5 U.S.C. §706(1).
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orities.84 Nonetheless, EPA (and the Office of Air and
Radiation in particular) is subject to hundreds of courtimposed deadlines.85
The Gersen-O’Connell study found that deadlines may
increase the speed with which agencies act by approximately 100 days on average, but that this effect was not
uniform across federal agencies, and represents only a 20%
reduction in the time necessary to promulgate a rule.86
In the case of EPA, which appears to be subject to more
statutory deadlines than any other agency,87 Gersen and
O’Connell found that actions without mandatory deadlines took an average of 685 days to complete. Those with
deadlines were not completed much faster, taking an average of 610 days.88
EPA routinely misses statutorily and judicially
imposed deadlines under the CAA. The aforementioned
2005 GAO study found that EPA had missed 256 of
338 statutory deadlines imposed under the 1990 CAA
Amendments.89 In other words, EPA complied with the
applicable statutory deadline less than 25% of the time.
Similarly, a 2016 analysis found that EPA failed to meet
more than 80% of the over 1,000 regulatory deadlines
imposed under the CAA.90
On average, the required actions were late or outstanding by more than four years. EPA was somewhat timely
in meeting its obligation to review state implementation
plans, being just under two years late on average. When it
came to emission regulations imposed on specific industrial
sectors, however—the sorts of rules likely to be required by
regulatory climate change legislation—the Agency was late
by more than 7.5 years on average.
Outside groups can sometimes file lawsuits to force
agencies to take overdue actions.91 This is only a partial
remedy. To take one relevant example, in December 2010,
EPA settled a lawsuit filed by environmental groups by
agreeing to propose new regulations governing GHG emissions from new and existing power plants no later than
July 26, 2011, and to promulgate final regulations by May
26, 2012.92 Yet, as noted above, the resulting CPP govern-

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

91.

92.

See U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 71.
See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 981 tbl.2.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 939 (noting EPA “faced over 1000 deadlines, more than any other
agency” during the period under study).
Id. at 981 tbl.2.
See GAO, Clean Air Act: EPA Has Completed Most of the Actions
Required by the 1990 Amendments, but Many Were Completed Late
3-4 (2005) (GAO-05-613).
See William Yeatman, Competitive Enterprise Institute, The EPA’s
Dereliction of Duty: How the Agency’s Failure to Meet Its Clean
Air Act Deadlines Undermines Congressional Intent (2016), https://
cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/William-Yeatman-EPAs-Derelictionof-Duty.pdf.
See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L.J.
819, 832 (1988) (“statutory deadlines increase the likelihood that a court
will find an agency’s delay unreasonable and will force the agency to remedy that delay”).
U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet: Settlement Agreements to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Generating Units and Refineries (2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2013-09/documents/settlementfactsheet.pdf.
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ing emissions from existing power plants was not proposed
until 2014 and not finalized until 2015.
Agency delay is partially a function of work load and
resources. Imposing deadlines on agencies to issue additional reports and adopt new regulations without increasing the personnel and resources available to complete such
tasks is a recipe for failure. Among other things, when
agencies are subjected to deadlines, this may limit public participation and compromise the quality of agency
decisionmaking.93 The mandated tasks may eventually
be completed, but not particularly quickly, nor is it likely
the agency can rapidly scale up its capabilities. If speed
matters, piling additional obligations on EPA and other
environmental agencies does not seem like a particularly
sensible strategy.

V.

Uncooperative Federalism

Much of federal environmental law adopts a “cooperative
federalism” framework, through which the federal government seeks to enlist the cooperation or participation of state
governments in the implementation and enforcement of
environmental regulations.94 State regulatory agencies have
more knowledge about local conditions, and may be more
responsive to local sensitivities and concerns.95 States also
have the “boots on the ground” to monitor and implement
various pollution control requirements.96 Accordingly, state
agencies are often the frontline enforcers of federal environmental laws, and the federal EPA lacks the personnel or
resources to substitute for or supplant state efforts.
Under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, the federal government may not “commandeer” state governments
to help implement a federal regulatory scheme.97 State participation must be voluntary. Further, for cooperative federalism programs to be effective, states must be willing to
affirmatively cooperate. Accordingly, many major environmental laws offer states the promise of financial assistance
and the threat of preemptive federal regulation as a spur to
“cooperation.”98 The extent of such inducements is limited,
93. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 976 (noting deadlines can
“produce a range of negative side effects, distorting agency procedures and
reducing the quality of decisions”); Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies in the Costs
of Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 467, 487
(1987) (noting deadlines may produce “hastily considered, socially inefficient rules”).
94. For a brief overview of the “cooperative federalism” model in environmental regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of
Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 384-87 (2005); see
also Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd: The Impact of Federal Action
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 67 (2007) (exploring conflict and coordination between federal and state governments in
environmental law).
95. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to Improve Environmental Policy 27 (1996).
96. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J.
1196 (1977).
97. See, e.g., Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461
(2018); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 22 ELR 21082 (1992).
98. See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After
NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 Ecology L.Q. 671, 683 (2016).
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however, as the Supreme Court has warned Congress not
to cross the line between inducement and coercion.99
The CAA is among the federal environmental statutes
that adopt a “cooperative federalism” model. Under the
CAA, the federal government sets the underlying pollution and emission standards, leaving states with the primary obligation to develop plans for implementing and
achieving the federal requirements.100 Failure to comply
within the applicable time frame can result in the threat
of a preemptive federal plan, increased pollution control
requirements, and the loss of federal funds that support
state-level environmental programs and highway construction.101 Such sanctions are not always imposed, however, as
EPA is reluctant to take over too many state responsibilities
or provoke too great a local backlash.102 As a consequence,
state recalcitrance may frustrate the achievement of federal
requirements even if such resistance does not lead to a fight
in court.
Federal regulation of GHGs, particularly from stationary sources, is likely to rely on cooperative federalism to
some degree, whether pursued under the CAA or new federal legislation. If EPA adopts federal standards for power
plants under the CAA, as with the Obama Administration’s CPP, these standards will be implemented by state
regulators—or at least by those willing to cooperate. Some
states were happy to go along when the CPP was promulgated. Others rushed to court and eventually got the program placed on hold.103
The proposed CLEAN Future Act would make even
greater use of the cooperative federalism model. Title VIII
of the proposed bill would require every state to adopt a
state climate plan that would lead to dramatic GHG emission reductions on a set schedule until the Act’s emission
control targets were achieved in each state. Through a system modeled on elements of the CAA, this proposal would
obligate states to comply or risk limits on federal projects
within the state (under the CAA’s “conformity” provisions)
and the imposition of a “backstop carbon fee.” Implementing these provisions would require extensive rulemakings
by EPA, and would surely invite legal challenge on the
grounds that the threat of a carbon fee is coercive, much
like the threat to cut off federal Medicaid funds was found
to be in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)
v. Sebelius, the landmark case on the PPACA.104
Congressional efforts to induce state cooperation are
likely to provoke serious constitutional challenge. While

99. See, e.g., National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(NFIB) (holding that conditioning continued receipt of Medicaid funding
on acceptance of Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutionally coercive).
100. See Adler & Stewart, supra note 98, at 682-91.
101. For a critical examination of the CAA sanctions provisions, and potential
constitutional objections thereto, see Adler & Stewart, supra note 98.
102. The CAA authorizes the filing of citizen suits to prompt EPA enforcement of the Act’s terms, including those relating to sanctions on noncooperating states.
103. See Lyle Denniston, States Move to Block “Clean Power Plan” (Updated),
SCOTUSBlog, Jan. 26, 2016 (reporting officials representing 29 states
sought a stay of the CPP from the Supreme Court).
104. 567 U.S. 519. For a discussion of how NFIB may apply to CAA programs,
see Adler & Stewart, supra note 98, at 701-13.
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many such measures may appear constitutional under current doctrine, much the same was said about the individual mandate when the PPACA was adopted. Many legal
academics were dismissive of claims that the individual
mandate, in particular, pressed against the outer bounds
of federal constitutional authority.105 Yet five Justices
ultimately concluded that Congress lacks the regulatory
authority to compel individuals to purchase qualifying
health insurance, even if Congress may impose a tax on
the failure to purchase such insurance.106
The unprecedented nature of a federal mandate requiring all individuals to purchase a specified good or service
was part of what made the legal challenges viable. While
some thought such a mandate was constitutionally indistinguishable from other assertions of federal authority that
had previously been upheld, five Justices concluded otherwise, in part because of a perceived need to vindicate
the principle that federal power has judicially enforceable
limits.107 In this regard, NFIB is not an isolated example.
Across a range of doctrines, the Supreme Court seems
reluctant to validate the constitutionality of new assertions
of federal regulatory authority. This was one reason the
Court invalidated the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion, and
it was the basis upon which the Court concluded that the
legislatively mandated structures of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board and Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau were invalid.108
This means that unprecedented expansion of federal
regulatory authority to address matters traditionally left in
the hands of state or local governments, or expansions of
existing inducements to state cooperation, are likely to be
particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Even
those measures that may seem to fit comfortably within
conventional understandings of existing constitutional
doctrine may be at risk.

VI. Comparing Regulatory Strategies
With Fiscal Alternatives
Not all climate policy initiatives are equally vulnerable to
legal challenge and administrative delay. As a general matter, fiscal tools are less vulnerable to legal challenge than are
regulatory measures. Subject to a few exceptions not relevant here, taxpayers lack standing to challenge the legality
105. See David A. Hyman, The Supreme Court’s PPACA Decision: Something Went
Wrong on the Way to the Courthouse, 38 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 243, 245
(2013) (noting “law professors were openly contemptuous of the suggestion that the [PP]ACA raised serious constitutional issues”). For an overview
of how the arguments in NFIB developed, see Josh Blackman, Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare (2013); see
also Randy Barnett, Jonathan H. Adler, David E. Bernstein, Orin S.
Kerr, David B. Kopel & Ilya Somin, A Conspiracy Against Obamacare:
The Volokh Conspiracy and the Health Care Case (2013).
106. See NFIB, 567 U.S. 519.
107. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Conflict of Visions in NFIB v. Sebelius, 62 Drake
L. Rev. 101 (2014).
108. See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477
(2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183
(2020). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Minimalism and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online, Aug. 27, 2020,
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/27/seila-adler/.
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of federal spending.109 So while there may be administrative hurdles to allocating and deploying resources, and
navigating the relevant scoping, environmental impact
assessment, and approval processes, the spending itself is
rather immune from legal challenge.110
Taxes may be politically controversial, but they are also
less vulnerable to legal challenge than regulatory measures,
and are easier to implement. As illustrated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in NFIB, the federal government has
broader authority to impose taxes than to regulate private
activity.111 Federal taxes on fuel consumption are clearly
constitutional, so it is unlikely there would be any basis to
challenge the constitutionality of a carbon tax, provided it
was set by statute.112
A carbon tax would also be easier to implement than
equivalent regulatory measures, or even than some sort
of cap-and-trade regime, such as that proposed in the
Waxman-Markey Bill in 2009. Adopting either a system
of standards and mandates or a cap-and-trade system for
GHGs requires making many more discrete decisions
about regulatory design and implementation than does a
carbon tax. Each such decision increases the complexity
of the endeavor, and creates opportunities for rent-seeking,
political manipulation, and, if such decisions are delegated
to an administrative agency, administrative delay and subsequent litigation.
While a tax can be designed to be relatively uniform,
and is therefore easier to draft into legislative language,
implementing a trading scheme necessarily requires many
decisions about how to allocate and value allowances (e.g.,
are the allowances to be allocated by auction, lottery, or
past behavior?). If by lottery, how is participation determined? If by past behavior, what behavior counts? What
is the relevant time period? Is it purely retrospective, or
partially prospective? What metric is to be used to evaluate
comparable, but not identical, activities? Must some allowances be discounted in certain sectors to account for monitoring or enforcement problems? And so on.113
Users of allowances are not the only ones with something to gain through rent-seeking. Those who seek to
trade or broker allowances can also capture rents by
influencing program design. This is true in the regula109. See DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (explaining general bar
on taxpayer standing); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S.
587 (2007) (noting narrow exception for some First Amendment plaintiffs).
110. On the potential administrative hurdles to green infrastructure projects, see
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets
the Old Green Laws?, 44 Vt. L. Rev. 693 (2020).
111. See NFIB, 567 U.S. 519.
112. Former EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott has argued in these pages
that EPA already has statutory authority to impose a carbon tax of sorts. See
E. Donald Elliott, EPA’s Existing Authority to Impose a Carbon “Tax,” 49 ELR
10919 (Oct. 2019). Any such effort by EPA would certainly provoke litigation, and raise the interesting constitutional question of whether Congress
may delegate taxing authority to federal agencies. On the latter question, see
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J.
239 (2005); see also James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax,
114 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (2015).
113. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Prices Versus Quantities, in Policy Instruments in Environmental Law 195 (Kenneth R. Richards & Josephine van Zeben eds.,
Edward Elgar 2020).
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tory context as well. Each discrete judgment about what
actions or technologies will satisfy the relevant standard,
and how standards will be implemented and enforced,
creates an entry point for rent-seeking and manipulation, as well as opportunities for litigation and delay.
Small decisions on the margin, such as how to account
for slight changes in fuel composition, will appear to be
minor technical decisions, but can actually mask serious efforts to obtain economic advantage through regulation.114 Carbon taxes, on the other hand, “pose fewer
issues with administrability.”115
The degree of administrative complexity also affects
the speed at which a climate policy can be adopted. British Columbia’s carbon tax system was adopted and implemented in less than six months—a fraction of the time
it typically takes EPA to adopt a single major rule. By
comparison, it took EPA several years to draft and adopt
the regulations implementing the CAA’s Acid Rain Program of tradable emission allowances, even though this
program only governed a discrete number of large polluting facilities and many key determinations, such as the
requirements for allocating allowances, were written into
the statute.116

114. The history of the oxygenated gasoline and reformulated gasoline programs
under the CAA provides numerous examples of this phenomenon. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Environmental Politics: Public
Costs, Private Rewards (M. Greve & F. Smith eds., 1992).
115. Hsu, supra note 113, at 195.
116. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned From Three
Decades of Experience With Cap and Trade, 11 Rev. Env’t Econ. & Pol’y 59,
61 (2017). The two experiences also suggest that it is far less expensive to
administer and implement a carbon tax than to adopt a tradable permit system. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Carbon Taxes, in Climate Change Law 431 (Daniel
A. Farber & Marjan Peeters eds., Edward Elgar 2016).
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The size and scale of the Acid Rain Program was also a
far cry from what would be required to control emissions of
GHGs. British Columbia’s carbon tax, on the other hand,
was economywide and began creating incentives to reduce
carbon use almost right away. In the United States, a carbon tax could “piggyback” on existing energy taxes to ease
implementation and administration.117

VII. Conclusion
Insofar as climate change calls for quick and dramatic
action to curb GHG emissions and clear a path toward
ultimate atmospheric stabilization of GHGs in the atmosphere, federal emission control regulation is an inadequate
prescription. Whatever the theoretical advantages of such
an approach, it would face significant practical obstacles,
administrative delays, and legal vulnerabilities. Consideration of the broader constitutional and administrative-law
concerns counsels shelving federal regulatory strategies in
favor of fiscal instruments, such as a carbon tax, that can
be implemented quickly and with fewer legal risks. If climate change is an urgent problem, policymakers should
choose their policy instruments accordingly.

117. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Market-Based Policy Options to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 23 J. Econ. Persp. 5, 21-22 (2009).
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